In this paper we present an analysis of the commodification of knowledge and information in contemporary capitalism. We provide a consistent account of how information as a commodity effects the workings of both capitalism and of Marxist theory. The first part of the paper critically revisits Marx's own writings on the commodification of knowledge and how the immaterial labour hypothesis initially interpreted these writings. Based on the new categories knowledge-commodity and knowledge-rent, we then present our own approach in response to the challenges raised by the immaterial labour hypothesis. Lastly, we analyse the more recent contributions on the commodification of knowledge and information within the Marxist literature. The current debate on the value of knowledge has been divided between two camps: the reproduction cost approach, and the average cost approach. At the end of the paper we present empirical estimates of the magnitudes of knowledge-rents.
Introduction
The commodification of knowledge and information has been an undeniable feature of our economic system. Copyrights, patents, and intellectual property rights have proliferated worldwide in the past decades (OECD 2013) . The commodity form thus appears to spare nothing and no one.
At every point in time in the history of capitalism when the commodity form took hold of a new economic object, a profound transformation would ensue. When the commodity form took hold of land, capitalist land rents emerged. When the commodity form took hold of labor power, wage labor and wages emerged. When the commodity form took hold of capital, interest-bearing capital emerged. Now we claim that when the commodity form took hold of knowledge and information, knowledge-rents emerged.
In this paper we present an analysis of the commodification of knowledge and information in contemporary capitalism. Our approach aims primarily at developing Marxist theory so that it can face the new challenges posed by the existence of commodified information. In the 19 th century Marx himself developed some deep insights on the future of science and information as productive forces within capitalism. Marx, however, had not yet experienced the vast and profound commodification of knowledge we experience nowadays. This fact bears consequences for the Marxist tradition, and it is our current task to provide a consistent account of how information as a commodity effects the workings of both capitalism and Marxist theory.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we will critically revisit Marx's own writings on the importance of knowledge in production and how the immaterial labor hypothesis initially interpreted these writings. In revisiting Marx's insights on the roles of science and the "general intellect" we will be able to see how he foresaw the production and distribution of wealth in a future stage of capitalism. The immaterial labor hypothesis originally raised the argument that capitalism has been going through a structural shift by relying ever more on immaterial commodities produced during non-labor time. The hypothesis of a supposed change in the nature of both labor and commodities began to question abstract labor as the substance of value, and as a consequence called into question the analytical validity of Marx's value theory.
Second, we present our own approach in response to the challenges raised by the immaterial labor hypothesis. We introduce new Marxist categories with the explicit purpose of theorizing the emergence of commodified information: knowledge-commodities with zero value, knowledge-rents, and knowledge-lords. Crucial to our argument is Marx's distinction between production and reproduction time, and between productive and unproductive activity. Our own approach, we claim, coherently integrates
Marx's value theory with the transformation of knowledge and information into
commodities.
Third, we analyze the more recent contributions on the commodification of knowledge within the Marxist literature. The current debate on the value of knowledge is divided between two camps: the reproduction cost approach (of Teixeira and Rotta) , and the average cost approach (of Starosta and Fuchs) . The reproduction cost approach claims that commodified knowledge tends to have zero value because of its costless reproduction. The average cost approach, on the contrary, claims that commodified knowledge has value and that its value is given by the initial expenditures necessary to produce it. We argue that the reproduction cost approach is theoretically superior to the average cost approach, as only the zero-value interpretation is consistent with the notion of moral (i.e. value) depreciation. We also present empirical estimates of the magnitudes of knowledge-rents, and then conclude the paper with final remarks on artificial intelligence and the limits of the Marxist theory of value.
Cognitive capitalism and the immaterial labor hypothesis
In an insightful passage in the 1857-1858 Grundrisse, a passage that did not reappear afterwards in any edition of Capital, Marx has an intriguing comment on the impact of technology and science on the limits of value as the form of wealth in capitalism. He explicitly posits that labor time is the measure of value. But then acknowledges that technology and science applied to production progressively render labor time a miserable measure of wealth. It is a lengthy passage but well worth quoting in full:
But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose "powerful effectiveness" is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production.
[…] Real wealth manifests itself, rather -and large industry reveals this -in the monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, and its product, as well as in the qualitative imbalance between labour, reduced to a pure abstraction, and the power of the production process it superintends.
[…] In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he [the worker] himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power … which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. This passage from the 1857-1858 Grundrisse was unknown to readers until its publication in 1939. In the 1990s it then became the basis for the immaterial labor hypothesis of André Gorz, Toni Negri, Michael Hardt, and Maurizio Lazzarato. The core idea of this hypothesis is that technological progress makes labor time an inadequate measure of value, for the "general intellect" depends ever more on what is produced during non-labor time. These authors identify the "transformation" that Marx alludes to as the transition from an industry-based to a service-based economy. This transition from industry to services is, in their understanding, the limit to value theory grounded on labor time.
Negri (1991), Hardt and Negri (2001; 2004) and Lazzarato (2006) have put forth the argument that immaterial labor has modified the forms under which capitalist production takes place. Immaterial labor, they claim, produces immaterial products such as knowledge, information, ideas, images, affection etc. The qualities and specific characteristics of immaterial production tend to transform the labor process and even society itself as a whole. In contrast to agriculture and industry, immaterial labor emerges in the service sector and does not produce tangible goods. Immaterial labor blurs the distinction between work and non-work time and changes the nature of labor time from quantitative to qualitative.
Gorz ([2003] 2010) developed a similar set of ideas under his notion of cognitive capitalism. According to Gorz, current production relations are more tied to the complex and unmeasurable dimensions of human capital than to the former tangible forms of fixed capital. This replacement of fixed capital by human capital occurs because capitalism has gradually subordinated to the profit motive the knowledge, the science, and the arts developed during non-work time. Gorz ([2003] 2010) also differentiates between the present post-Fordist worker and the former industry worker still attached to the assembly line. The worker typical of Fordism is an appendix to material production and its work time is measured in hours of repetitive physical effort. The post-Fordist worker, on the contrary, is known for the qualitative aspects of its labor, for its knowledge and skills, for its behavior and improvisation, for its imaginative and cooperative capabilities mostly nurtured outside of the workplace. The concept of immaterial labor poses a theoretical challenge to Marxist theory.
If abstract labor is no longer the substance of value then value has lost both its internal measure in labor time and its role in regulating production and exchange. One crucial consequence of value losing its internal measure in labor time is that the price system becomes more arbitrary and dependent on non-economic factors such as monopoly rights.
In the next section we address these concerns and show how it is possible, and logically consistent, to remain within the Marxist theory of value while concomitantly acknowledging the recent transformations in capitalism.
Knowledge-commodities and knowledge-rents
In a more recent analysis, Teixeira and Rotta (2012) , Rotta and Teixeira (2016), and Rotta (2018) propose a solution to the theoretical challenge inherent to the concept of immaterial labor. In these studies we conceptualize the role of commodified knowledge but we do so within Marx's value theory, without rejecting abstract labor as the substance of value.
In this regard it is crucial to distinguish between production and reproduction in the determination of value and socially necessarily labor time. Marx begins Capital at a very high level of abstraction, a stage in his theoretical exposition at which we only find the production of commodities. Growth, reproduction, and inter-capitalist competition
are not yet explicitly (even though they are implicitly) included in the analysis 2 . But as 1 See Smith (2013) for a critique of Virno and Vercellone and also for a further critique against the immaterial labor hypothesis for not properly considering the distinction between wealth and value in Marxist theory. 2 Fausto (1987a; 1987b) At the initial higher level of abstraction, in which only production is featured, commodity production determines the magnitude of values. But once reproduction is explicitly brought into the picture at a more concrete level of analysis, value is then determined by the conditions of commodity reproduction. The Marxist theory of value is fundamentally reliant on the difference between the production and the reproduction of commodities. Because of its undue focus on the very first chapters of Capital, the Marxist tradition has misunderstood how reproduction (not production) determines value and socially necessary labor time.
Once the reproduction of capital is explicitly brought into the analysis, Marx posits that what determines the value of any commodity is not the socially necessary labor time required for its production but the socially necessary labor time required for its reproduction.
For example, from Capital I:
But in addition to the material wear and tear, a machine also undergoes what we might call a moral depreciation. It loses exchange-value, either because machines of the same sort are being produced more cheaply than it was, or because better machines are entering into competition with it. In both cases, however young and Because it produces no new value, the creation and ownership of commodified knowledge is actually an unproductive form of capital accumulation (Rotta 2018) .
Productive activities are those activities that create new surplus value, while unproductive activities are those that do not create new surplus value. Because knowledge and information can be reproduced without any labor, its production generates no value and hence no surplus value, and must therefore be classified as unproductive activity.
A knowledge-commodity is, in all cases, a commodity. It has value and use-value as its social determinations. But quantitatively this value is zero, because the measure of value is the (zero) labor time necessary to reproduce the commodity. The knowledgecommodity does not lose value as one of its determinations, otherwise it would cease to be a commodity in the first place. It is thus more accurate to speak of knowledgecommodities with zero value than of valueless knowledge-commodities, even though we employ these two terms interchangeably. This is somehow analogous to a situation in which the temperature of an object is zero degree Celsius. The temperature as a property (physical, not social in this analogy) of the object is present, as the kinetic energy of its constituent particles, even though quantitatively the temperature on the Celsius scale is zero.
A corollary of the above reasoning is that what Hardt, Negri, Lazzarato, and Gorz labeled as "immaterial labor" belongs mostly to the unproductive side of capitalism.
Commodified knowledge and information have no value and hence cannot contain any surplus value. The profits that accrue to knowledge owners are knowledge-rents that represent value drawn from other value-producing activities in the economy. This is consistent with Marxist value theory and thus cannot be an argument favoring the dismissal of labor time as the measure of value.
The main theoretical misunderstanding of those who advocate the end of Marx's theory of value is that they have not properly conceptualized the difference between production and re-production time, and neither the difference between productive and unproductive activity. Even though the language is not completely clear, Marx gave us a hint of this reasoning:
[The] product of mental labor -science -always stands far below its value, because the labor-time needed to reproduce it has no relation at all to the labortime required for its original production (Marx [1863] 1988:Addenda to Vol. 1).
Once discovered, the law of the deflection of a magnetic needle in the field of an electric current, or the law of the magnetization of iron by electricity, cost absolutely nothing.
[…] Science, generally speaking, costs the capitalist nothing, a fact that by no means prevents him from exploiting it (Marx [1887] 1990:508).
In Capital III Marx then considers the existence of use-values that require no labor to be reproduced:
[The] use-value is the general bearer of the exchange-value, but not its cause. If the same use-value could be created without labor, it would have no exchangevalue, yet it would have the same useful effect as ever (Marx [1894 (Marx [ ]1994 .
It is, nonetheless, crucial to distinguish between the knowledge-commodity itself and other tangible and non-tangible commodities that it might be attached to. In certain cases the knowledge-commodity is traded (sold or licensed) per se. Examples are when customers and companies purchase the license to use software, or when a company pays the royalties required to use a specific drug formula. But in other cases the knowledgecommodity can only be traded if bundled together with another commodity. This situation leads to a potential theoretical confusion if we do not properly distinguish the knowledgecommodity itself from the other commodities bundled together with it.
A few examples might clarify this instance. When a band performs a live concert its fans must pay for the entrance tickets. The ticket price covers the costs of all the inputs used such as the musical and technical equipment necessary for a live concert. The ticket price also covers the compensation of the productive labor of the musicians performing live to the public. However, the musicians are playing copyrighted compositions, and this is where the knowledge-rents arise. The copyrighted songs are knowledge-commodities When you buy a smartphone, part of the phone price covers the production costs of the physical components. But another part of the price remunerates the patented design and the copyrighted software stored in the memory. The copyrighted parts of the phone are therefore knowledge-commodities, and the revenues associated with these specific components are knowledge-rents. This implies that your smartphone is in fact a combination of more than one commodity. A share of the phone price pays for the productive labor of those workers making the physical components. Another share of the phone price pays for the knowledge-rents, out of which the knowledge-lords pay for the unproductive labor of those workers making the design and the software 3 .
Even fixed capital in the form of machines and equipment are combinations of different commodities. Suppose that a company takes ten years to develop a new type of machine capable of performing a very precise process. The physical machine does need labor time to the reproduced, and hence it contains value. But the copyrighted design and the copyrighted blueprint of the machine are the knowledge-commodities inherently attached to the machine itself. The same goes for any software used to operate this machine. This copyrighted knowledge is the knowledge-commodity that gives rise to knowledge-rents. Therefore, knowledge-commodities and knowledge-rents are present even in fixed forms of capital like machines and equipment. The physical part of this fixed capital suffers both use-value depreciation and value (moral) depreciation, such that the machine gradually transfers (and hence loses) its value to the output. But the copyrighted part of this fixed capital does not have value and the payments associated to it are knowledge-rents.
The knowledge-commodity is not a commodity that is knowledge-intensive. The knowledge-commodity is not the technical artifact in which information is stored. The knowledge-commodity is the commodified information itself. For example, take the case of pharmaceuticals. A pill (the tangible drug) is not a knowledge-commodity. The knowledge-commodity is the information that allows the company to make the drug in the first place. The information that allows the pharmaceutical company to make the drug is a commodity because this useful information was produced with the explicit purpose of making a profit. Hence, this information is commodified. But because commodified information has zero value, it gives rise not to surplus value but to rents. For the knowledge-commodity to have zero value, we do not even need to wait until another competitor company can reproduce this drug at zero labor time. The pharmaceutical company that paid for all the initial sunk and fixed costs of research and development can itself already reproduce this commodified information at zero labor time. For a knowledge-commodity to have zero value is not necessary that competitors replicate it.
The innovating company that created the knowledge-commodity in the first place can already reproduce this commodified information indefinitely, regardless of what its competitors do.
Marx's theory of ground rent related only to agriculture and mining (Fine 1979; Harvey 2006:349-357; Rigi 2014; Basu 2018 ). But we can now draw on his insights to claim the existence of four categories of knowledge-rents:
Monopoly Rent: Because of intellectual property rights the owner of information is able to price (the use of) its knowledge-commodities above their zero value, hence extracting a monopoly rent from its users. The intellectual property rights transform a non-scarce commodity into one that is artificially scarce. The monopoly rent exists regardless if the user of the knowledge-commodity is a final consumer or a company using it as an input. If the owner of the knowledge-commodity sells not its use rights but the actual ownership, then the price of the knowledge-commodity is the discounted expected stream of future knowledgerents.
(ii) Differential Rent type I (DR-1): Each knowledge-commodity gives rise to different levels of productivity for the companies using them as inputs. If certain companies use a particular software to enhance their productivity, these privileged companies will obtain DR-1. The software gives them a concrete productive differential. This is analogous to lands with different levels of fertility. But if all companies use the same software, the productive differential is eroded and DR-1 ceases to exist. Note that software need to be upgraded constantly but, in any case, each upgraded version is a new knowledge-commodity with zero value. (2008) and Teixeira and Rotta (2012) had originally claimed that absolute knowledge-rents could exist, but Rigi (2014) correctly pointed out that absolute rents are not a constituent part of knowledge-rents: "the surplus value that is transformed into patent rent is not produced in the knowledge sector … knowledge has no value, and, therefore, the knowledge sector does not produce surplus value at all. This surplus value is produced outside the knowledge sector".
contrary, the rise of rentier activities and of other types of unproductive activity is exactly what Marx had conceptualized through his notion of value autonomization (Rotta and Teixeira 2016) .
In the next section we turn to the more recent developments in the Political Economy literature regarding the roles of knowledge and immaterial labor.
The commodification of knowledge and information: the recent literature
The Political Economy literature on the commodification of knowledge and information has been growing steadily in the past decades. At the present moment the scholarship is divided between two camps in regard to the determination of the value of commodified knowledge. The reproduction cost approach posits that commodified knowledge tends to have zero value, and that knowledge-rents are appropriations of the global pool of surplus value in the economy. The average cost approach, on the contrary, posits that the initial investment necessary to create commodified knowledge (the research and development costs to produce the "mold") determines the value to be realized once the knowledge-commodity is sold or licensed. In this section we highlight the advances made in this debate. Our understanding is that the reproduction cost approach is theoretically superior to the average cost approach because it is the only one that is consistent with the notion of moral (i.e. value) depreciation.
Foley (2013) draws from the Classical Political Economy distinction between
productive and unproductive activities to claim that commodified information contains no value and that its ownership gives rise to intellectual property rents. The unique feature of commodified information is that, unlike the case of land rents in which the same soil can be used for only one crop at a time, the same piece of information can be used by multiple parties concomitantly. Unlike land, knowledge is non-rival and hence its owner can extract rents multiple times over from costless copies of the same commodity. These rents, Foley argues, are part of a pool of surplus value generated in capitalist production though they have no direct relation to the exploitation of productive workers in themselves. The production of knowledge and the associated intellectual property rights allow unproductive capitalists to grab a share of the global pool of surplus value without directly contributing to it. Foley also notes that despite being classified as an unproductive activity, knowledge creation can indirectly raise the productivity of labor in productive activities.
On this same issue, Foley has a very good passage on how the creation of surplus value is actually an unintended by-product of the struggle to appropriate (not necessarily to produce) surplus value. Which implies that, in capitalism, economic growth is an unintended by-product of the pursuit of profits:
[ to the unproductive pursuit of the appropriation of surplus value, sooner or later profit rates in productive sectors will rise and profit rates in unproductive sectors will fall, according to the general law of competition (Foley 2013:261) . Jeon (2011) further notes that in the Marxist tradition in South Korea there has been an intense debate between those who think that knowledge-commodities have value and those who think otherwise. Among those who believe that knowledge-commodities have value, the main argument is that the fixed capital and all the costs behind the production of the very first unit (the "mold") must be taken into account into the unit values of the output. Hence, if this hypothesis is correct, the value of knowledgecommodities is the average cost per unit produced inclusive of all sunk and fixed costs.
Given the large expenditures with machinery, laboratories, and research and development that need to be spread out across all copies sold, the average cost of knowledgecommodities cannot be zero. But such an approach ignores Marx's value theory grounded on reproduction time. As we have seen in the last section, Marx was very explicit about the fact that reproduction, not production, determines the value of any commodity. Jeon (2011) also notes that in the group of Korean scholars that identify with the hypothesis that knowledge-commodities have zero value, there has been a convergence toward the idea that intellectual property rights do imply the existence of information rents. Starosta (2012) and Fuchs (2015) also disagree with the notion that knowledgecommodities have zero value. These authors believe that value is determined in a similar way to average costs. And because average costs are the total costs (inclusive of fixed costs like plants and equipment) divided by the output, the value of knowledgecommodities is not zero. Starosta warns against attempts of determining the values of commodities taken individually:
[The] determination of the value of the individual commodity can no longer be considered in isolation but must be directly posited in its organic relation to the mass of commodities whose unity embodies the valorization of the capital invested.
[…] the total value is determined "first" and then shared out equally by each individual commodity, which now contains a proportional fraction of the and into the conditions of use (Starosta 2012:373-376 ).
Starosta argues that the total value of the entire output must be divided across each unit produced. This average cost approach to the determination of value is therefore an attempt to remain within the boundaries of Marx's value theory, while at the same time rejecting the claims that Marx's value theory has become obsolete in cognitive capitalism.
Starosta cites passages from Capital, mostly drawn before Marx explicitly introduces reproduction into the analysis, to corroborate his perspective. But ignores those that contradict his claims. What determines the value of any commodity is the labor time required to reproduce it. And this reproduction time bears no relation with the labor time originally required to create the commodity in the first place. Contrary to average costs, reproduction time does not rely on the sunk and fixed costs originally employed in the production of the mold: "the value of the capital advanced … rises or falls as a result of an increase or decrease in the labour-time necessary for its reproduction, an increase or decrease that is independent of the capital already in existence" (Marx [1894] 1994:237-238 − emphasis added). Reproduction time can thus fall to zero after the mold is produced regardless of the large amounts of fixed capital used in its conception.
The immediate drop in the reproduction time of knowledge-commodities after the mold is created does not derive from a sudden fall in the average cost due to economies of scale and neither from a change in technology. The extreme case of moral depreciation that characterizes knowledge-commodities derives from the structure of the existing methods of reproduction of commodified knowledge and information. For this reason, moral depreciation is logically consistent only with a theory of value based not on average costs but on reproduction time. We do not have to claim, therefore, that knowledgecommodities have value in order to save Marx's value theory.
Starosta (2012) and Fuchs (2015, chapter 5; 2017) thus disagree with the notion that knowledge production is a type of unproductive activity. Our claim that knowledge creation is an unproductive activity might indicate that the unproductive workers creating knowledge and information are not exploited. But this is definitely not the case:
[A]ll capitalistically employed labor is exploited by capital, whether it is productive labor or unproductive labor. The rate of exploitation of each is their respective ratio of surplus labor time to necessary labor time.
[…] In the case of productive workers, their rate of exploitation is also the rate of surplus value, since their surplus labor time results in surplus value (Shaikh and Tonak 1994:31) .
In Capital III Marx claims that by exploiting unproductive workers the unproductive capitalist grabs a share of the global pool of surplus value:
It is only by way of its function in the realization of values that commercial capital functions as capital in the reproduction process, and therefore draws, as functioning capital, on the surplus-value that the total capital produces. For the individual merchant, the amount of his profit depends on the amount of capital that he can employ in this process, and he can employ all the more capital in buying and selling, the greater the unpaid labour of his clerks. The very function by virtue of which the commercial capitalist's money is capital is performed in large measure by his employees, on his instructions. Their unpaid labour, even though it does not create surplus-value, does create his ability to appropriate surplus-value, which, as far as this capital is concerned, gives exactly the same result; i.e. it is its source of profit. Otherwise the business of commerce could never be conducted in the capitalist manner, or on a large scale. Just as the unpaid labour of the worker creates surplus-value for productive capital directly, so also does the unpaid labour of the commercial employee create a share in that surplusvalue for commercial capital. (Marx [1894 (Marx [ ]1994 Contrary to Fuchs's approach, and drawing from Teixeira and Rotta (2012) , Rigi Within the Marxist tradition, an early mention of a category akin to "knowledgerent" is from Ernest Mandel (1975:192) in his theory of "technological rents" as the surplus profits derived from monopolized innovations that reduce production costs.
Haddad (1998) uses the term "knowledge-rents" more precisely to indicate the revenues whose origin lies in the labor of "knowledge workers" employed at private companies. Perelman (2003:305) and Zeller (2008) further establish a comparison between land property rights and patents. But despite their insights, these authors do not develop a consistent value theory of knowledge-rents as we do in Teixeira and Rotta (2012) and Rotta (2018) .
Zeller (2008), in particular, offers an attempt at theorizing information rents within a Marxist framework. He posits that intellectual property rights are similar to the enclosure of the commons in the time of primitive accumulation. Even though claiming explicitly that information rents are monopoly rents, Zeller does not explicitly engage into a discussion of whether or not commodified information has value. Despite analogies to land rents and accumulation by dispossession, in his work there is no further theoretical development besides the claim of monopoly rents associated to patents. As we put forth, without a proper value theory of commodified information it is not possible to develop a consistent theory of information rents. Zeller (2008:97) seems to suggest that commodified knowledge does have value and that patents ensure the value of knowledge is realized, but if commodified information has value then the analogy with monopolized land (which does not have value) and land rents is unclear:
Knowledge is a product of labor. But the problem lies in the fact that information and technology once produced are usually quite simple to reproduce, and therefore the realization of the exchange value is questioned […] The phase of producing knowledge and information whose acquisition will be secured based on a patent is normally characterized by a high share of variable capital. Therefore, a potentially high surplus value arises here. But it is not yet realized. (Zeller 2008:97-99 -emphasis added) As Teixeira and Rotta (2012:456-459) hence the lease payments are interest payments. In the case of licensed knowledge there is no value being borrowed, and hence the payments associated with it are not interest but rents instead. Unworked land yields rents to its owner because unworked land requires no labor to be produced (as it is a free gift from nature) and thus contains no value.
Without a consistent value theory, as Teixeira and Rotta (2012:456-459) develop, there is a great risk in conflating interest and rent.
The Political Economy notion that knowledge has zero value is featured in mainstream Economics, albeit under a different value theory, as the zero marginal cost of knowledge (Duffy 2004 ). Shavell and van Ypersel (2001:545) note that this special feature of knowledge also applies to industries producing pharmaceuticals, software, movies, recorded music, books, and visual products.
Rotta (2018) is one of the yet few empirical works that attempt to estimate the actual size of knowledge-rents and their evolution over time. Using input-output matrices and national income accounts for the United States from 1947 to 2011, Rotta (2018) arrives at aggregate and disaggregate estimates of Marxist categories for both productive and unproductive activities. The rise of knowledge-rents is just one dimension within the larger secular trend of rising unproductive activity. Unproductive activity has been growing at a fast pace in terms of incomes, fixed assets, and employment. The total income of unproductive activities quadrupled relative to the total value generated in productive activities during the 1947-2011 period. The estimates reveal that knowledge creation and finance have been the fastest growing unproductive activities both in terms of net income and capital stock. As percentage shares of the net income of all unproductive activity within the American economy, there has been substantial growth in the shares of finance and insurance from 14% to 23.2%, and also in knowledge and information rents from 7.9% to 17.4%. Finance and knowledge-rents combined have risen from 21.9% to 40.5% of the net income of all unproductive activity, hence nearly doubling in the postwar period. As percentage shares of the net capital stock in all unproductive activities, the fastest growth rates in shares have been in knowledge and information (from 0.8% to 5.0%) and in finance and insurance (from 1.7% to 10.3%).
Finance-and knowledge-related activities have grown their combined capital stocks six fold (or 502%) from 1947 to 2011 as a share of the total unproductive capital stock. In this regard, Fuchs (2013; 2015; 2016; also Fisher and Fuchs 2015) has done some interesting work on the production of knowledge and information in social media like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Myspace, WordPress etc. His argument is that the users themselves are producing the content of the information commodities.
Social media companies appropriate and commodify user-generated content without paying for the labor time required to produce it. In return, these companies offer their services without charge. Fuchs thus labels these users as prosumers: consumers that actually produce the content that they themselves consume. Social media companies are responsible for providing the digital platform, thus encoding all the content, and then receiving fees from advertisers.
In spite of our theoretical disagreements in terms of value theory, Fuchs does offer an interesting hypothesis, namely that on social media it is the users (the prosumers)
themselves that generate the information that is then gathered and commodified by the companies developing the online platforms. Wikipedia, the biggest encyclopedia in the history of humankind, would be another great example of user-generated content, even though in this particular case there is no profit motive and hence knowledge is not commodified. The question that remains open is if, once produced by the users themselves, these information commodities on social media still require labor time to be further reproduced. From our perspective, this user-generated content online necessitates labor to be produced but, once produced, necessitates no further labor to be reproduced.
Companies like Google and Facebook can commodify the online content of their users but it is still a commodity with zero value. Our argument does not negate the possibility that the users are somehow 'exploited' when they generate the content online that is later on gathered, processed, and commodified 5 . It does question, however, the notion that this online content on social media has value. Our understanding is that commodified information, because of its effortless reproduction, has always zero value regardless of who produces it.
Implications and final remarks
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate on whether or not commodified knowledge has value, the Marxian Political Economy literature has been able to reach one consensus:
that, contrary to the immaterial labor hypothesis, there is still no need to reject the Marxist value theory. The immaterial labor hypothesis has claimed that Marx's value theory is no longer relevant in cognitive capitalism. In this paper we argued otherwise, namely that 5 Following Smith's (2013) analysis of "free gifts" to capital, we could claim that when data are produced by people using computers as a by-product of their activity online, the data are provided to capital as a "free gift" outside the commodity form, becoming a commodity only at some later point in some other process. Hence, Fuchs' notion of 'exploitation' of online users does not employ Max's concept of exploitation in its strict sense.
the commodification of knowledge and information can be explained in a consistent way within the Marxist value theory.
This does not mean, of course, that the Marxist theory of value faces no limits. As a theory that is contingent on a specific mode of production and on a specific historical moment, it will make evident its own constrains. One possible case, even still within the capitalist mode of production, is that of artificial intelligence (AI). In Marxist theory, only direct human labor creates new value. Machines and equipment transfer their values to the output but do not add any new value to it. AI could challenge this idea, for it is a nonlabor input that does create a new output not previously conceived, foreseen, or planned by human labor. AI implies that fixed capital itself has productive and creative powers, independent of the human labor originally used to program it in the first place. Our understanding is that the reproduction cost approach is superior to the average cost approach for two main reasons. First, the reproduction cost approach is much closer to Marx's own insights on value theory. Second, the reproduction cost approach is the only approach consistent with the notion of moral (i.e. value) depreciation; the average cost approach is not. Our empirical estimates also indicate that knowledge-rents have been rising both as a share of the total income of unproductive activities and relative to the total value created in productive activities.
